Ad quartum concedo quod isosceles in quantum isosceles habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis.

Et cum inducit Aristoteles in contrarium, I Posteriorum, dico quod ibi sumitur by *in quantum* specificativa et (etiam ed.) reductive, modo verum est quod isosceles sub ratione isosceles non habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, sed sub ratione trianguli, quia proprium primo inest speciei et per speciem individuus, secundum Porphyrium in *Universalibus*.igitur etc.

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The Soul of the Antichrist Necessarily Will Be a Being: A Modal Sophism in 16th Century Logic Texts

by Jeffrey S. Coombs

In logic texts of the early 16th century, logicians wondered whether the proposition 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being' (*anima antichristi necessario erit ens*) is true or false. Their discussions primarily revolve around the issue of scope, that is, whether the modal term 'necessarily' is within the scope of the temporal term 'will be', although along the way other interesting topics arise, such as multiple conceptions of necessity, the temporal connotations of the modal terms, and the truth conditions for divided modal propositions. We will focus on the works of two logicians, both of whom taught at the University of Paris within the first two decades of the 16th century: the Spaniard Jeronimo Pardo, and the Scot Robert Cabaith.

The structure of these discussions betrays their sophistic roots. This proposition 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being' is presented first with arguments for its truth and then with arguments for its falsity, just as in *Sophismata* tracts of the 14th and 15th centuries. In fact, many arguments are taken (with citation) from the *Sophismata* tracts of William of Heytesbury and Paul of Venice. Pardo and Cabaith, however, do not discuss this *Sophisma* in an independent *Sophismata* tract, as is the case for Paul of Venice. They instead use this *Sophisma* (and others) as a counterexample to their general method for determining the truth and falsity of modal propositions. Thus, Jeronimo Pardo discusses this *Sophisma* in chapter 8 of his *Medulla dyalectics*, a work devoted to determining the truth-conditions of many different types of statements. Chapter 8 of Pardo's text is devoted to presenting rules for determining the truth and falsity of modal propositions. Robert Cabaith considers this *Sophisma* in the fourth chapter of his work, the *Quaeripertin in oppositiones, conversiones, hypotheticas. et modales.*

Pardo's discussion of the *Sophisma* 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being' (*anima antichristi necessario erit ens*) begins with the usual presentation of arguments for and against its truth. Pardo holds that 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being' is true, and in section I we will consider his defence of it. Pardo's defence relies

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2 Jeronimo Pardo, *Medulla dyalectics*, Parisiiis 1505. I have used the copy of this text reproduced in the Vatican Film Library, microfilm series, roll 37.11, cited hereafter as 'MD'. Robert Cabaith, *Quaeripertin in oppositiones, conversiones, hypotheticas. et modales*, Parisiiis 1509. I have used a copy of this edition which can be found in the British Library, cited hereafter as 'Quod.'
on the idea that the modal term 'necessarily' is within the scope of the
temporal term 'will' be'. In section II, we will see Caubraith's answer to
Pardo. Caubraith will opt for the 'common' view that the sophisma is false
and he argues against Pardo's defence by claiming that the temporal
expression is within the scope of the modal term.

I

Pardo states that the argument showing the truth of 'The soul of the
Antichrist necessarily will be a being' runs as follows. Assume that the
soul of the Antichrist will be produced at some time. After it is produced, it
will be eternal and incorruptible. This soul necessarily exists because
'necessarily' is understood in terms of 'physical' necessity. An entity is
physically necessary if and only if it cannot be destroyed by any created
agent.3

The usual (common) opinion, Pardo claims, is that, on the contrary,
'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being' is false because it
entails that the soul of the Antichrist cannot possibly fail (non poterit non)
to exist.4 This is false because it is quite possible that the soul of the
Antichrist not come into existence at all, since God might choose not to
produce the Antichrist, or the Antichrist's parents might never meet, etc.

After Pardo outlines attacks on the 'common' opinion, he proposes
his own argument for the truth of this sophisma. His main argument is

The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be [a being] after time \( t \).

Therefore, the soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be [a being].

Time \( t \) is the moment at which the soul of the Antichrist comes into
existence, and since this soul is immortal, it cannot be destroyed after \( t \).5

Pardo proceeds to defend the truth of this argument's premise, and then the
argument's validity.

Pardo defends the truth of the premise 'The soul of the Antichrist
necessarily will be a being after \( t \)' by following his general approach to
determining the truth value of divided modal propositions. Divided modal
propositions were modal propositions in which the mode appears in the

middle of the proposition and the mode separates the terms of the
proposition.6 The primary rule for determining the truth value of divided
modal propositions was, according to Pardo (and many others in the early
16th century).

"Each true divided modal proposition is reducible, that is, its truth
is made manifest, through one or through many necessary or
contingent, possible or impossible non-modal (de inesse)
[propositions]. ... If in fact the proposition contains the mode
'possible', it must be reduced to one or many possible non-modal
(de inesse) [propositions]. That is, its truth must be made manifest
through one or many possible non-modal (de inesse) [propositions].
Similarly if it contains the mode 'necessary', its necessity must be
made manifest through one or many necessary non-modal (de inesse)
propositions."

Thus, a modal proposition is changed to a non-modal (de inesse)
proposition, of which the evicted mode is predicated. The mode then
becomes a 'metalinguistic' predicate of the sentence. For example,

Jeff is possibly drinking sherry,

which is a divided modal proposition because 'possibly' appears in
the middle, becomes

'Jeff is drinking sherry' is possible.

The primary aim of this approach is the clarification of the scope of the
modal term. For although determining the non-modal counterpart of modal
propositions is easy when there are no logical operators, quantifiers,
or modal or temporal terms present, when these latter sorts of expressions do
appear in the proposition, additional rules had to be proposed to deal with
the ensuing confusion. For example, the proposition 'The soul of the
Antichrist necessarily will be a being after \( t \)' requires this additional rule
for determining its truth value since it contains a future tensed verb:

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3Caubraith, Quad.: f. cxii(3va). "In modali divis a modus mediet inter partes dicti et non
in modali composita. Et illa est ratio potissima quaere vocatur composita et altera
divisa. Dictur enim composita...qua partes dicti ex parte eiusdem extremum
comportant unum extremum totale constituentes. Et divisa quia partes dicti
adivisse per modorum dividentur ad diversa extrema se applicant." ("In a divided
modal proposition the mode is in the middle between the parts of the dictum, but this
does not occur in composed modal propositions. And this is the strongest reason
why one is called composed and the other divided. For [the one] is called composed
because the parts of the dictum are composed into the same extreme [term], and the
parts of the dictum make up one total extreme [term]. And [the other] is called
divided because the parts of the dictum are divided from one another by the mode, placing
themselves into separate extreme terms.

4MD., f. cxii(3va). "Quaelibet modals divis a vera est reducibilis, id est, manifestabilis
sua veritas, per unam vel per pluribus de inesse necessarias vel contingentes, possibles
vel impossibles... Nam et si de possibili, debet reduci ad unam vel pluribus de inesse
possibles, id est, debet sua veritas manifestari per unam vel pluribus de inesse
possibilitates. Similiter si et de necessario, debet manifestari sua necessitas per unam
vel pluribus de inesse necessarias, et sic de aliis modis.

5Caubraith, Quad.: f. cxii(3va). "Ab hac propositione sit concedenda 'animal
antichristi necessario est post a', quia est necessario est. Antecedens
probatur, quia post a est eternum et incorruptibile, ergo post a necessario est."
"divided modal propositions, when the modes are joined to verbs of the past or future tense, first must be reduced to propositions of the present tense while keeping the modes the same, and after that they must be reduced to de iesesse propositions." 8

This statement of Pardo’s view may lead one to conclude that we should simply ignore the tense of verbs in divided modal propositions, which would be a very strange result. However, Pardo accepts (in a modified form) the common opinion (ascribed to Buridan in the margin of Pardo’s text) that:

"propositions about the past or future are not true unless a proposition about the present corresponding to them was or will be true." 9

Thus, the tense of the verbs in a proposition about the past are not ignored; they are pushed into what we would now call the ‘metalanguage’, just like the modes. Thus, ‘Socrates ran’ is true only if ‘Socrates runs’ was true. As Pardo himself tells us:

"a proposition about the past or the future is said to be true or false in virtue of a proposition about the present. Thus a proposition about the present is called by logicians ‘absolutely first’ (simpliciter prima) because other propositions must be called true or false in virtue of it." 10

Pardo finally states that the proposition ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being after r*’ is true because

"every proposition about the future, which at some time will have a true present tense proposition to which it truly reduces, is true." 11

In the particular case under consideration, ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily is a being after r*’ is true because the following at some time in the future will be true:

This soul necessarily is a being after r*.

12Ibid., t. cviii(b), "Modales diviaeae quando modo junguntur verbis praecepti aut futuri temporis, prima habet reducti in propositiones de praesenti talibus modis manentibus, et postea ialae habent reducti in propositiones de iesesse..."

13Ibid., t. lxxiii(a-b). "Propositiones de praecertio vel futuro non sunt verae nisi propositio de praesenti eis respondeat fuit vel erit vera."


15Ibid., t. cviii(a). "Omnis propositio de futuro, quae semel habebit unam de praesenti vera in qua vere reducitur, est vera.

The soul necessarily is a being after r*.

Speaking, of course, in terms of physical necessity. 12 The assumption here seems to be that the statement ‘This soul necessarily is a being after r*’ is only true after r*. In essence, then, Pardo is suggesting that the tense term has the modal term within its scope. The final analysis of ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being after r*’, using ‘F’ for ‘it will be the case’ and ‘L’ for ‘it is necessary that’, is:

F(t) (the soul of the Antichrist is a being after some time r*).

Pardo next defends the validity of the implication from ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being after r*’ to ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being’. 13 Common opinion, Pardo tells us, argues against this implication because according to it ‘necessarily’ and ‘impossibly’ are ‘universal modes’. Universal modes are such that when they are added to a verb connoting a time they distribute the verb for every time connoted by it. 14 The modes ‘possibly’ and ‘contingently’ are ‘particular modes’ because they make the verbs to which they are attached connoted for every time usually connoted, except they do so ‘dissociatively’. 15 In the case at hand, the proposition ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be’ expresses that idea that for every time f later than the present moment m, the soul of the Antichrist necessarily is at f. The proposition ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being after r*’ is a weaker claim, assuming, as Pardo does, that there are moments of time between the present moment and r*.”

16Ibid., t. cviii(b). "Sed an sequatur anima antichristi necessario erit [ens] post a, ergo anima antichristi necessario erit [Ros] dubium videtur.

Ibid. "Unde quidam est modus dicendi communiis qui solat teneri videant se quaestur modi sic se habent videant se quod li necesse et li impossibile sunt modi universalis qui quando addantur verbo connotante tempus, distribuant ipsum pro quotlibet tempore importato per ipsum."

Ibid., "liy possibile et li contingens sunt modi particulis et factum accipits pro omni tempore importato dissolutus."

Ibid. "si aequatur, notum est quod ista est falsa 'anima antichristi necessario erit' quando li 'erit' ut importat tempus, quia li 'erit' distributur pro quotlibet tempore futurus. Ideo non valet consequentia: anima antichristi necessario erit post a, ergo anima antichristi necessario erit, cum argui us ab inferiori ad superius cum distribuuntur superioris" (it if this manner [of speaking] is held, it is obvious that this is false: 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be' understanding 'will be' insofar as it implies time, because 'will be' is distributed for every future time. Therefore this argument is not valid: the soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be after a, therefore the soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be since in [it] one argues from an inferior to a superior when the superior is distributed.)"
Pardo answers by stating that there are reasons for thinking that 'necessarily' does not distribute the time connoted by the verb. First, such a view must concede that a term is distributed in two contradictory propositions, such as:

Socrates necessarily is running

and

Socrates possibly is not running.

Pardo seems to think that the view of his adversaries must interpret the first as:

\(\forall t(Socrates \text{ necessarily is running at } t)\)

since 'necessarily' distributes 'is'. His adversaries must think the second says:

\(\forall t(Socrates \text{ possibly is not running at } t)\)

since 'not' distributes 'is'.\(^7\) So interpreted, of course, they are no longer contradictory. The real contradictory of the first should be:

\(\exists t(Socrates \text{ possibly is not running at } t)\).

A second problem is that the propositions

Socrates is not necessarily running

and

Socrates is possibly not running

are usually thought to be equivalent. However, 'is' in the first is not distributed because two distributing terms ('not' and 'necessarily') appear together.\(^8\) For similar reasons, the two distributing terms 'not every' do not distribute when together. So, Pardo believes that this view would interpret the first as

\(\exists t(Socrates \text{ is not necessarily running at } t)\)

and the second as

\(\forall t(Socrates \text{ is possibly not running at } t)\).

The second is distributed for all times because of the distributing term 'not'. So interpreted, the two propositions are no longer equivalent.

Third, the view requires that two contradictory propositions would be false at the same time. This is false:

The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being assuming that a lot of time (\textit{multum temporis}) will pass before the Antichrist is created.\(^9\) Remember, 'necessarily' distributes 'will be' for all future times. This, too, is false:

The soul of the Antichrist possibly will not be a being because it implies (given that 'not' distributes 'will be')

The soul of the Antichrist possibly will not be a being at \(t^*\),

where \(t^*\) is a time after the soul of the Antichrist is created. This latter proposition is false because given the physical necessity of the created soul of the Antichrist, its contradictory 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being at \(t^*\)' is true.\(^20\)

Pardo finally points out in what sense he thinks 'necessarily' is a universal mode. It is called universal because the necessary implies the possible, but not vice versa, just as universal propositions imply indefinite

\(^7\)Ibid. 'Sed [iste modo dicendii] de ly 'necesseario' non videtur verum, quod probatur quia tunc sequetur quod in ambus contradictorios terminus distributur ut in istis duobus 'Socrates necessario est currentem', 'Socrates possebbilior non est currentem', ly 'est' in utraque distributur et patet in prima per ly 'necesseario', in secunda per negationem.' ('But [this manner of speaking] about 'necessarily' does not appear to be true, which is proven because then it would follow that a term would be distributed in two contradictions, just as in these two: 'Socrates necessarily is running', 'Socrates possibly is not running', 'is' is distributed in both as is obvious in the first because of 'necessarily', in the second because of the negation."

\(^8\)Ibid. 'Sequenter estiam quod in equidembus secundum equidemvitias quae duae in consequentia modalium non sest consimilis aceptio terminorum. Nam iliae duae equidem 'Socrates non necessario est currentem' et 'Socrates possibilitior non est currentem' in quibus tamen ly 'est' non eodem modo accipitur. Nam in prima non distribuitur propere duo distributiva.' ('It would also follow that in equivalent propositions] according to the equivalences which are given in the section on the modal consequences, there would not be a similar meaning of the terms. Indeed, these

\(^9\)Ibid. "Ideo inferius inconveniens tale quod duae contradictoriae essent simile falsae. Primo ista est falsa 'anima antichristi necessario erit ens', postea quod multum temporis transibit ante quam ipsa producatur. ('Therefore, an unacceptable result follows such that two contradictions will be false at the same time. First, this is false: 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being', assuming that a lot of time will pass before this 'soul' is produced.')

\(^20\)Ibid. "[Ista eiem est falsa 'anima antichristi possibilitor non erit ens' cum una descendentis sit falsa, scilicet ista 'anima antichristi possibilitor in hoc instanti (demonstrando aliquod instantis quod erit post productionem istius animae) non erit ens', quia sae contradistincta est vera, scilicet ista 'anima antichristi necessario erit in hoc instanti.' ('This too is false 'The soul of the Antichrist possibly will not be a being' since one of its descendants is false, namely this: 'The soul of the Antichrist possibly at this instant (when referring to some instant which will be after the production of this soul) will not be a being', because its contradictory is true, that is, this: 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be at this instant.'"

\(t^*\)
(that is, particular) propositions, but not vice versa. ‘Necessary’ is therefore not ‘universal’ in virtue of distribution but in virtue of a rough analogy between the implications among the modes and those among the quantifiers.\(^{21}\) So, ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being’ is true because

"Its truth is manifested through one [proposition] about the present which at some time will be true, namely, through this ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being.’\(^{22}\"

II

Robert Caubraith considers a slightly different proposition from Pardo’s, namely ‘The soul of the Antichrist will be’ instead of ‘The soul of the Antichrist will be a being’. Although these logicians were very concerned with slight variations in expression, the difference between these two propositions does not seem of importance to them.

Caubraith will ultimately claim that ‘The soul of the Antichrist will be’ is false, but first he reveals the sophistic roots of his discussion by giving arguments for and against accepting it. Here, as for Pardo, the main concern is that these arguments count against the usual rule for understanding divided modal propositions containing the mode ‘necessarily’:

"Every affirmative divided modal proposition is either reduced to one non-modal proposition or to many; to one with regard to singular terms, to many in the case of common terms."\(^{23}\)

The proposition ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be’ violates this principle since, Caubraith argues, it is true, but the non-modal proposition to which it is reduced is not necessary. The non-modal proposition to which it is reduced is

This soul will be

where ‘this’ refers to the soul of the Antichrist. This latter proposition Caubraith claims is contingent.

Caubraith presents two arguments for the truth of ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be’. The first is the familiar argument borrowed from Paul of Venice and abbreviated by Pardo:

"((la) The soul of the Antichrist in this time (referring to the time at which it will be produced) necessarily will be. Therefore, (lb) the soul of the Antichrist at some time necessarily will be. Therefore, (lc) the soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be.'"

Premise Ia is true, Caubraith says, because at the time the soul of the Antichrist exists it cannot be destroyed by any natural power since every soul is eternal.\(^{24}\)

The second argument supporting ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be’ is:

God sees the future soul of the Antichrist.

Therefore, the soul of the Antichrist cannot fail to be about to be.

This argument holds because if one denies it, then it is possible that God would see the future soul of the Antichrist and that soul possibly will fail to be about to be. If we assume that this possibility is actually the case, then God would not see the future soul of the Antichrist even though that soul will not exist. Thus, it would be possible that God be deceived.\(^{25}\)

Both arguments fail, in Caubraith’s opinion. In the first argument, Caubraith concedes the validity of argument from Ia to Ib but denies the premise Ib, ‘The soul of the Antichrist at some time necessarily will be.”\(^{26}\) His reasons for accepting the validity of this argument are not very strong, since he seems to agree with an attack on it which can be found in Paul of Venice. This attack states that the argument is invalid because it argues from a non-distributed term to one that is distributed.\(^{27}\)

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\(^{21}\) Ibid., “Ido dico quod non oportet quoddam ‘necessario’ distribuat copulam. Quod autem dicitur modus universalis in ordine ad ty ‘possible’, hoc est quod ad ty ‘necessaria’ sequitur ‘possible’ sed non e contra, quemadmodum ad propositionem universalam sequitur indifferens sed non e contra, et ido non vocatur modus universalis quod habeat aliquam virutem distribuendam.” (“Therefore I say that it is not obligatory that ‘necessarily’ distribute the copula. That, however, it is called a universal mode in relation to ‘possible’, it is the case that ‘possible’ follows from ‘necessary’ but not vice versa, just as an indefinite proposition follows from a universal but not vice versa, and thus it is not called a universal mode from the fact that it has some capacity to distribute [the copula].”)

\(^{22}\) Ibid., ff. viliib-cxix(a). “Ido concedo istam propositionem ‘anima antichristi necessario erit ens’ loquendo de necessitate praedicta, cuibus fundamentum totum est hoc, quia seu veritas manifestatur per unam de praesenti quae semel erit vera, sollicit per istam ‘anima antichristi necessario est ens’.” (‘The necessitas praedicta is physical necessity.

\(^{23}\) Quad., f. cxiiiiib. “Omnis modalis affirmativa divisa reducenda est ad unam de inesse vel ad plures, ad unam ex parte termini singularis, ex parte vero terminorum communitur, ad plures.”

\(^{24}\) Ibid., “Alregor haec propositio est vera ‘anima antichristi necessario erit’, et tamen sua de inesse non est necessaria, ergo regula est nulla. Minor pariet, haec est sua de inesse ‘haec anima erit’ quam constat esse contingente, et maior probatur, anima antichristi in aliquo tempore necessario erit, ergo anima antichristi necessario erit. Consequentia videtur tenere, et antecedentem probatur, anima antichristi in isto tempore necessario erit, tempus in quo erit producta demonstrando, cum in illo tempore illa anima non potest deservi per potentiam saltem naturalen. Omnis enim anima a parte post est perpetua.”

\(^{25}\) Ibid., “Iam, deus vidit illam animam futuram, ergo illa anima non potest non fore. Consequentia tenet quod data opposito consequenti cum antecedente haberemus quod deus vidit illam animam futuram et quod illa anima potest non esse, quod posito inesse habebatur quod deus vidit illam animam futuram et quod illa anima non erit, ex quo clare sequitur deus decipit possit.”

\(^{26}\) Ibid., f. xxxviib(a). “Aliter dico concessa consequentia, negando antecedentem.”

\(^{27}\) Ibid., f. cxxxvii(a). “[R]espondeo negando illam propositionem, et consequenter negatur major argumenti principalis, et ad eum primam probatorem respondit Paulus Venerus, negando consequentiam quoniam arguatur a non distributo ad distributum...ex
We earlier saw this point discussed by Pardo. Even though it may be the case that the soul of the Antichrist will be necessary at some time in the future, it does not follow that that soul will be necessary at all future times, that is, for all times after the present moment. Caubraith makes the point explicit by claiming that arguing that lb implies lc is like arguing:

The soul of the Antichrist at some time necessarily will be.

Therefore, the soul of the Antichrist will not at some time possibly not be.\textsuperscript{28}

It seems that the point can be reconstructed in this way: the argument moves from

\((\exists t)(\text{the soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be at } t)\)

\rightarrow

\(\neg(\exists t)(\text{the soul of the Antichrist possibly will not be at } t)\),

which surely is a misapplication of the modal rule which states that ‘necessarily \(p\) = not possibly not \(p\).’

Without citing any reason, Caubraith decides to accept the validity of both of these arguments. He instead attacks the truth of lb since he thinks it could be shown false by arguments similar to those he had already given against ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be’. Furthermore, Caubraith rejects la, ‘The soul of the Antichrist at this time (referring to a time after it is produced) necessarily will be’. If someone responds to this rejection that the soul of the Antichrist cannot be corrected after it is created, and is thus necessary, Caubraith answers that he rejects the idea that it will necessarily be, but not because he denies that it could not have been corrected after it was created, but rather because it was possible that it never had been produced in the first place.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29}ibid. “...et si argumentur: anima antichristi in aliquo tempore necessario erit, ergo anima antichristi non in aliquo tempore possibiliter non erit.”

\textsuperscript{30}ibid. “Sed quoniam illud antecedens est falsum, ut probabiliter potest probari, sicut de principali propositione probatum est. [Aliter dico consequentia consequentia negando antecedentem, et ulterius nego hanc ‘anima antichristi in hoc tempore necessario erit,’ tempus in quod erit producit demonstrando.”

\textsuperscript{31}ibid. “Et quando arguis in illo non poterit corruptum et in illo erit, ergo tunc necessario erit, nego consequentiam, non enim illam [sec., ‘in illo antichristi poterit corruptum’] concedo quia postquam illa anima est, possit corrupti, sed [illum concedo] quia potest nonquam produci.” (“And when you argue at this [instant] it will not be possible to destroy [the soul of the Antichrist], and at this [instant] it will be, therefore, then it will necessarily be. I deny the implication, for I do not accept this statement: ‘at this instant the soul of the Antichrist could be corrupted’ because after this soul is, it could be destroyed, but because this may never be produced.”)
Caubraith supports this claim with no lesser authority than the New Testament. For when Christ said to Peter, 'You will deny me thrice', he knew Peter would sin but not that Peter would necessarily sin. For if Peter had necessarily sinned, he would not really have sinned, because there can be no sin when the action must take place necessarily.26 So too supposing God knows that the Antichrist will be damned, the Antichrist still is possibly not damned, although it would never come to be that he is not. It is still within the power of the Antichrist not to be damned.37

Caubraith attacks another possible defence of 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be' by distinguishing 'logical' from 'physical' necessity as Pardo did.38 If the necessity in question is logical necessity, then all three of the following propositions must be true:

The soul of the Antichrist necessarily was a being,

The soul of the Antichrist necessarily is a being,

and

The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being.

if 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be' is true.39 Implicit in Caubraith's remarks here is that if something is logically necessary, then it is necessary at all times.40 Since this soul is not now necessary nor was in the past, then 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be' is false when interpreting 'necessarily' in this case as a logical necessity.

Some unnamed logicians (perhaps Pardo?), Caubraith claims, hold that 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be' is true given the 'physical' notion of necessity.41 Caubraith argues against this solution by pointing out that 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be' implies

The soul of the Antichrist not possibly will not be,

which must be false, he thinks, because its contradictory

The soul of the Antichrist possibly will not be is true.42 Caubraith proves this latter point by arguing that

The soul of the Antichrist will not be is possible because

"the generation of the of the Antichrist can be prevented accordingly so too the production of the soul of the Antichrist."43

A further argument against 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be' is that if this soul, which does not now exist, necessarily will be, it follows that everything which will come to be, necessarily will come to be. This outcome, Caubraith says, conflicts with Aristotle's views.44 For these reasons, Caubraith decides, contra Pardo, to deny that 'The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be'.45

Caubraith seems to be aware of Pardo's discussion of this sophisma although he never mentions Pardo by name. He presents Pardo's view in this way:

"Another argument could be made to show the truth of The soul [of the Antichrist] necessarily will be, and thus its non-modal [proposition] at some time will be true, and since it is of the future, it follows that the original is true. The assumption is clear; after the production of the Antichrist, this true 'this soul necessarily is' when understanding 'necessarily' always in a qualified way, that is, as it expresses natural necessity of the future and of the potential."46

Caubraith chooses to respond only "briefly" to such a view by denying its presupposition that one first reduces such a proposition with regard to its future tense copula rather than its modal term.47 Caubraith

42Ibid. "Contra quem arguitur: sequitur bene anima antichristi necessario erit, ergo ipse non possibiliter non erit. Falsitas consequentis patet per veritatem eius contradictoriae, quae est haec 'anima antichristi possibiliter non erit'.

43Ibid. "[Q]uid autem illud antecedens sit possibile patet quia generatio antichristi potest impediendi et per consequens productio animae antichristi."

44Ibid. "item, si anima antichristi, quod nunc est, necessario erit, sequitur quod omne quod eventiet de necessitate eventiet. contra Aristotelem primo herimerias. Caubraith may be referring to De Int., chap. 9, 1802-26-19a7.


46Ibid. "Posset fieri aliud argumentum ad probandum illam veram 'haec anima necessario erit', et hoc sic sua de inesse aliquando etsi vera, et cum sit de futuro, sequitur illam esse veram. [A]supsum ptet post productionem antichristi, haec est vera 'haec anima necessario est' proportionabiliter semper censendo by 'necessario', puta ut dicat necessatem futuritionis et potentialitas."

47Ibid. "Ad primum istorum dicitar breviter negando praesuppositum, illa enim non quis debeat ex parte copulae de futuro ad inesse reducere quan ex parte modi." (To the first of these I briefly answer by denying the assumption, for this must not be reduced
seems to be making the interesting point that the modal term is not within the scope of the temporal expression, but that the temporal expression is within scope of the modal term. Thus, Caubrauth would interpret this sentence as:

\[ LF(\text{the soul of the Antichrist is}), \]

where 'L' is 'it is necessary that' and 'F' is 'it will be the case that'.

In Pardo’s defence, we can still point out that if this proposition is truly ambiguous, then Pardo has made some progress by explaining one sense in which it is true. However, Pardo would certainly not be justified in thinking (as he seems to) that his interpretation is the only one possible. In fact, these logicians now need to give arguments for thinking that one of these interpretations should take precedence over the other.

Caubrauth also apparently had not read Pardo very closely, since he proposes problems with Pardo’s approach for which Pardo had already provided solutions. Caubrauth claims that the copula in ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be’ is modified by a universal term. Caubrauth seems to be referring to the doctrine we have already seen that ‘necessarily’ has a universal connotation, and accordingly the proposition ‘The soul of the Antichrist will be’ would have to be true at all future times in order for ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be’ to be true. Pardo has already answered this by denying that ‘necessarily’ has the universal connotation with regard to time.

To summarize, we have seen that while Pardo has insisted that the temporal term ‘will be’ should take precedence over the modal term ‘necessarily’ in ‘The soul of the Antichrist necessarily will be a being’, Caubrauth thinks that the temporal expression is within the scope of the modal term. Neither, however, sufficiently proves that his interpretation is the stronger – or only – interpretation.

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1 In respectful opposition to the judgement of L.M. de Rijk, who wrote: “As a matter of fact, Buridan himself seems to feel quite uneasy about his ‘debeo tibi equum’ case (see Scott, pp. 141-2). It must be considered an intruder, indeed. The last case of appellation (‘equum’ in ‘debeo tibi equum’) is not a correct one, since it is just a case of supposition, Buridan’s extending the ‘venientem’ case to the ‘equum’ case (i.e. the adjectival noun cases to the substantival noun cases) seems to be rather abortive.” Buridan’s Doctrine of Connotation, in The Logic of John Buridan, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1976, p.100. For a more sympathetic evaluation of Buridan’s doctrine see A. Malabre, Significatio et connassio chez Bur Idan, in the same volume. Cf also Joel Biard, “Le cheval de Buridan: Logique et philosophie du langage dans l’analyse d’un verbe intentionnel”, in Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, ed. Olaf Pluta, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, Amsterdam: Gruter 1989.